Climate Denialisms

Climate change denial is as old as the scientific study of global warming. At the close of the Cold War, the same “merchants of doubt” who had previously sought to minimize risks associated with smoking, acid rain, and nuclear winter once again seized upon the epistemological problem of uncertainty—inherent in any form of scientific research—first to deny the warming effect of carbon dioxide, and then to obscure its impact.

Is climate denialism finally on the wane? Until recently, there seemed to be cause for guarded optimism. That an energy transition was necessary raised fewer objections, even if what passed as climate change awareness was essentially based on incentive pricing mechanisms (carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes) designed to internalize the ecological externalities of fossil capitalism. However, both the failure to keep global heating below the 1.5°C threshold set by the Paris Agreement and the rise of a radical right hell-bent on oil and gas extraction suggest that the reports of the political elites’ conversion to sobriety were exaggerated, to say the least.

To account for the current regression, we must first identify the actors who structure the debate on climate issues and examine how their arguments and their lobbying succeed in pushing what counts as common sense toward the far-right. While reason used to be on the side of green capitalism, whose promoters claim that the transition to a carbon-free world is as much a priority as it is compatible with the profitability of investments, the mainstream is now being overtaken by two kinds of hardcore climate change deniers: the detractors of an allegedly militant or woke ecology intent on depriving ordinary people of their cars, their meat and their fertilizers, and the apostles of a neo-Malthusian environmentalism predicated on energy sovereignty, closed borders and birth control in the Global South.

On paper, the painless greening and win/win solutions promoted by Net Zero advocates is at odds with the exhortation to “Drill Baby Drill” that serves as the Trump administration's slogan. In practice, however, the differences between the two approaches are often a matter of degree, especially in a context of heightened geopolitical tensions and shifting alliances: compounded with the logic of capital accumulation in fossil fuel and renewable energy sectors, the rivalries that shape industrial policy in the US, Europe, and China tend to subordinate sustainability imperatives to security objectives. Meanwhile older modes of climate change skepticism may be gradually giving way to outright cynicism, as illustrated by the increasing prominence of either bunker mentality or escape to Mars fantasies in far-right circles. 

The tipping point that we are reaching calls for both nuance and intransigence. On the one hand, the shortcomings of the COPs should not be confused with the scorched earth policy pursued by their enemies. Yet on the other hand, similarities between crude denialism and strategies of adaptation to climate change cannot be overlooked. This becomes all the more stark as governments ostensibly sensitive to the climate emergency choose to spur investment in risky technologies of geoengineering instead of pivoting away from fossil assets.  

EXTRACTIVISM, GREEN AND BROWN

by Thea RIOFRANCOS Interview conducted on 14 March 2025
EXTRACTIVISM, GREEN AND BROWN

"When I talk about green capitalism, it is kind of a mix of productive forces that are already deployed to produce certain products that at least are justified because they have some role in greening the economy, whether that's a lithium battery or lower carbon steel, but also unproven technologies like geoengineering or carbon capture."

Timelines

A Brief History of Geoeconomics from the 1970s to Trump 2.0

1973

23 May 1970

OPEC and the First Wave of Resource Security. OPEC’s rise in the 1970s marked a turning point in Global South sovereignty over resources, challenging Western control by nationalizing oil industries. The 1973 oil shock, Chile’s 1971 copper nationalization, and rising fears of resource scarcity spurred U.S. policies like Nixon’s “Project Independence” and Carter’s energy security push. These revived WWII-era stockpiling strategies, including lithium. Today’s calls for a “Lithium OPEC” echo this earlier scramble to control extractive frontiers central to global capitalism.



2008

01 January 2008

The Commodity Boom. The 2008 commodity boom, driven by China’s industrial rise, exposed Global North anxieties over resource dependence amid the financial crisis. While the U.S. reeled from economic collapse and movements like Occupy rose, resource-exporting nations thrived. Rare earth elements—vital for green tech—became a strategic concern as China gained control over 70% of supply. These materials, though not rare geologically, pose severe environmental and health risks in China, where lax regulation has led to toxic pollution and rising cancer rates in mining regions.


2018

01 January 2018

Resource Security under Trump’s First Mandate. In 2018, the Trump administration expanded the definition of “critical minerals,” easing regulations to boost domestic extraction, notably of lithium. This shift, rooted in economic nationalism, linked mineral policy to national security and industrial revival. Executive Orders and bipartisan bills like Murkowski’s “American Mineral Act” framed reliance on Chinese imports as a threat. Ethical concerns over foreign extraction—raised even by officials like Francis Fannon, then Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Energy Resources at the State Department—bolstered calls to reshore supply chains or source from trusted allies to safeguard the clean energy transition.


2021-2024

01 January 2021

Biden’s Industrial Push for Green Dominance. The Biden administration expanded Trump-era mineral policies, tying resource security to the energy transition. A 2021 supply chain review led to a vertically integrated lithium strategy, invoking the Defense Production Act and funding mining, R&D, and recycling. The 2021 Infrastructure Act and 2022 IRA and CHIPS Acts provided billions in incentives while imposing strict sourcing rules to limit Chinese inputs. By 2024, Biden raised tariffs sharply on Chinese EVs, batteries, and minerals, framing green tech dominance as both economic and geopolitical strategy—blurring the line between climate action and protectionism.


2025

01 January 2025

Trump 2.0. Since returning to office in 2025, Trump launched an aggressive critical minerals agenda. Executive Orders 14241 and 14272 invoked the Defense Production Act, expedited permits, and investigated import risks. Another order promoted offshore seabed mining for cobalt and rare earths. In May, 10 new mining projects were fast-tracked under the FAST-41 program. These moves aim to boost U.S. resource autonomy and reduce dependence on China, while securing dominance in tech-critical minerals—paradoxically paired with a broader rollback of renewable energy investments.